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Constitutional Law-CRIMINAL DEFENDANT GUARANTEED RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION IN STATE OR FEDERAL CouRTs-Faretta v. California, 95 S.
Ct. 2525 (1975).
Sixteenth and early seventeenth century England did not recognize the
right to counsel in criminal cases.' In fact, ultimate recognition of this right
in 1695 was considered a special privilege bestowed at the discretion of the
Crown,2 rather than a logical development of the common law. Under
modern English law, the defendant has an absolute right to counsel, but
he must also be allowed to conduct his own case as to matters of fact,
leaving issues of law to counsel.3 It remains unclear, however, whether this
concept of self-representation was a right at common law or a corollary of
the right to appointed counsel.4
In contrast to its development in England, the right to counsel was
guaranteed in 1791 by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.' Prior to the passage of the sixth amendment, the right to counsel for
1. See 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 324-57 (1883). The
prisoner's defense was made by way of argument and altercation with the prosecution and
the other witnesses on a face to face basis. Id. at 349. But this was done in the setting of a
criminal trial that differed in several important ways from today's criminal trials:
(1) The prisoner was kept in confinement more or less secret till his trial, and could
not prepare for his defence. He was examined, and his examination was taken down.
(2) He had no notice beforehand of the evidence against him, and was compelled to
defend himself as well as he could when the evidence, written or oral, was produced
at his trial. He had no counsel either before or at the trial.
(3) At the trial there were no rules of evidence, as we understand the expression.
The witnesses were not necessarily (to say the very least) confronted with the prisoner,
nor were the originals of documents required to be produced.
(4) The confessions of accomplices were not only admitted against each other, but
were regarded as specially cogent evidence.
(5) It does not appear that the prisoner was allowed to call witnesses on his own
behalf; but it matters little whether he was or not; as he had no means of ascertaining
what evidence they would give, or of procuring their attendance. Id. at 350.
2. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213 (2d ed. 1898).
3. See Rex v. Parkins, 171 Eng. Rep. 1311, 1312 (1824); Rex v. White, 170 Eng. Rep. 1318,
1319 (1811).
4. Many critics argue against the theory that self-representation was a right. Their view is
that self-representation was commonplace only because there was no other alternative open
to the defendant. See note 1 supra; Comment, The Pro Se Defendant: No Right to Say No,
23 EMORY L.J. 523, 524 (1974).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
RECENT DECISIONS
a criminal defendant, as well as the right of self-representation, were both
guaranteed by federal statute.' Today all states must provide appointed
counsel for indigents,l and the constitutions of thirty-seven states currently
recognize the right of self-representation.8
In Faretta v. California,' the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the states must also permit self-representation in criminal cases.
In 1942 the Court had decided that the right to defend pro se' was not to
be limited by the Bill of Rights." In that same decision the Court noted in
dictum that self-representation itself was a constitutional right.' Never-
theless, the federal circuit courts split on whether there is a constitutional
right to self-representation in criminal trials. Five circuits held the right
to be guaranteed by the sixth amendment,'3 while three held the right to
6. [IUn all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own
causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the
rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(1970).
The present version provides that "[iln all courts of the United States the parties may plead
and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as by the rules of such courts, respec-
tively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." Compare the language of FED.R. CRIM. P. 44(a):
Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel
assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance
before the federal magistrate or the court through appeal, unless he waives such ap-
pointment.
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). A Florida defendant charged with a felony
had been denied counsel. The Supreme Court, overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
held that the sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel was made obligatory upon
the states by the fourteenth amendment.
8. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 275 nn.6 & 7 (2d Cir. 1964).
9. 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
10. As used in this article pro se will mean by self-representation.
11. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942): "[Ihe procedural
safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not to be treated as mechanical rigidities. What were
contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters."
12. The short of the matter is that an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent
choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so
likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assis-
tance of counsel. Id. at 275.
The Court noted this right to be embodied in the sixth amendment as a correlative right to
the right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 279.
13. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Price, 474
F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 930 (1970); United States v. Odom, 423 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970); Arnold v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); Hodge v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967);
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be only statutory. 14
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, after interviewing
the defendant, Anthony Faretta, decided he had not made an intelligent
and knowing waiver of his right to assistance of counsel and therefore
denied him the right to proceed pro se. 5 A public defender had been
appointed to represent Faretta at the arraignment, but Faretta requested
well before trial that he be permitted to represent himself."6 Faretta ap-
pealed the court's ruling, and in view of the division between the federal
courts 7 the Supreme Court granted certiorari"8 on a writ from the Court of
Appeals for the Second Appellate District of California.
In a six-to-three decision the Court held that the sixth amendment
also embodied the right not to have counsel, and this right was appli-
cable to the states under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 9
The Supreme Court grounded its decision in: (1) the history of self-
representation prior to the passage of the sixth amendment, (2) decisional
and state constitutional law since the passage of that amendment, and (3)
the requirement of "fundamental fairness.""0
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that English and
American jurisprudence supported the contention that the right of self-
representation, even though not mentioned in the sixth amendment, is
embodied therein as a correlative right.2 Self-representation was a com-
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1007 (1966); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964); Reynolds v. United States,
267 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1959); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 920 (1958).
14. Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966); Juelich v. United States,
342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 911 (1959).
15. 95 S. Ct. at 2528 n.3. The superior court's decision was made in accordance with the
then recent California Supreme Court ruling in People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489,
103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
[T]aking into consideration the recent case of People versus Sharp, where the defen-
dant apparently does not have a constitutional right to represent himself, the Court
finds that the ends of justice and requirements of due process require that the prior
order permitting the defendant to represent himself in pro per should be and is hereby
revoked. That privilege is terminated. 95 S. Ct. at 2529 n.4.
16. 95 S. Ct. at 2527.
17. Cases cited notes 13 & 14 supra.
18. 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
19. 95 S. Ct. at 2527.
20. Id. at 2530-41.
21. Id. at 2533. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961); Comment, Self-Represen-
tation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. Rav. 1479
(1971).
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mon practice in criminal trials in sixteenth and early seventeenth century
England."2 As English criminal procedure underwent reforms, the right to
counsel was recognized, but the defendant retained his right to self-
representation.2 The American colonies made various attempts to preserve
a similar right of self-representation, primarily as a result of their distrust
of lawyers. 4 Finally, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 17 8 9 n just one
day before the sixth amendment was proposed. 6 This analysis led the
Court to conclude:
In sum, there is no evidence that the colonists and the Framers ever doubted
the right of self-representation, or imagined that this right might be consi-
dered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel. . . .The Framers selected
in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right
of self-representation.Y
The Supreme Court also noted that its analysis is bolstered by the recogni-
tion of a right to defend pro se in criminal trials, albeit in different forms,
in thirty-six state constitutions.n
The Court went further to review its own decisions interpreting the
provisions of the sixth amendment. Initially, the Court merely acknowl-
edged that lack of counsel did not invalidate a conviction, provided the
waiver was competently and intelligently made.29 Later, in several cases,
it indicated in dictum that the pro se election was not only permissible,
but was in fact guaranteed as a correlative right embodied in the sixth
amendment guarantee of appointed counsel in a criminal trial." Numerous
22. See note 1 supra.
23. The Treason Act of 1695 provided for court appointment of counsel "upon his or their
Request." The necessary implication is that the defendant was free to conduct his own
defense in the absence of such a request. This view was made more explicit in early nineteenth
century case law. Cases cited note 3 supra.
In Rex v. Woodward, [1944] 1 K.B. 118, 119, the court noted that "no person charged with
a criminal offense can have counsel forced upon him against his will."
24. See 18 U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NoTEs 9 (1974).
25. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
26. For relevant portions of text see note 5 supra.
27. 95 S. Ct. at 2539-40.
28. Id. at 2530 n.10.
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938). The Court also noted that when a
defendant appeals a decision because there was no competent and intelligent waiver of coun-
sel, he has the burden of proof.
30. The cases cited by the Court in support seem less than conclusive. In Adams v. United
States ex reL. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1942), the only question before the Court was
whether petitioner's waiver of trial by jury was effective though made without aid of counsel.
The Court said it was not. In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934), the Court
merely assumed for purposes of the case that the power to defend pro se would be guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. Nor does Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) seem
1976]
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federal circuit court decisions also support the idea of a sixth amendment
right to self-representation.' Respect for individual autonomy was consid-
ered paramount over the interest in a just outcome.32
Considering the amendment's historical background, the majority of
state constitutions, and a broad range of decisional law, the Court ruled
that the sixth amendment does guarantee the right of self-representation
in criminal trials.3 The rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment are
"fundamental and essential" and therefore obligatory upon the states by
the fourteenth amendment.3 4
There are some logical difficulties with the Court's conclusion. Critics
of the decision in Faretta point out that at early common law the pro se
defense was not identified as a right, but rather as the only defense the law
recognized.3 5 Moreover, the English developments subsequent to 1791 are
only helpful insofar as they accurately interpret common law prior to 1791.
The Supreme Court has stated that the Judiciary Act of 1789,11 passed by
a Congress which included many members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, is to be regarded as "a contemporaneous exposition of the highest
authority. '37 It can be argued, however, that the failure of Congress to
specifically include the right of self-representation in the sixth amend-
ment, when that right had been specifically included in the statute, indi-
supportive since it contrasts the defendant's "constitutional prerogative" of being present at
trial with his "recognized privilege" of conducting his own defense. Furthermore, in Price the
Court found that "[a] prisoner has no absolute right to argue his own appeal or even to be
present at the proceedings in an appellate court." Id. In Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-
75 (1946), the Court noted:
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it derives from progres-
sive standards of justice denies a person the right to defend himself or to confess guilt.
Under appropriate circumstances the Constitution requires that counsel be tendered;
it does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant.
Again, Carter dealt with a defendant who had already waived counsel, the Court noting that
the Constitution does not require counsel. The Court did not say the defendant has a constitu-
tional right to self-representation.
31. Cases cited note 13 supra.
32. Particularly unequivocal is the following statement:
[Elven in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his
own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail
under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice 'with eyes open.'
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
33. 95 S. Ct. at 2532.
34. Id. at 2532, 2541. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
35. See notes 1 & 2 supra. See generally Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues
Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
36. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
37. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 300-01 (1930).
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cates the intent of Congress that the right of self-representation in criminal
trials be only statutory.38 Furthermore, in Singer v. United States, the
Supreme Court found that "[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right
does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that
right." 39 The majority in Faretta accepted this view that rights should not
be mechanically inferred, but nevertheless concluded that Singer is distin-
guishable by the different historical background of the right involved. 0
There is authority for the view that there is no constitutional right to
defend pro se and that the court has considerable discretion to refuse the
defendant permission to discharge counsel." This view is based on the idea
that a layman, even if intelligent, lacks the skill and knowledge to prepare
adequately his own defense. The government's goal in a criminal trial
should be to promote justice, rather than simply satisfy the defendant's
requests or win the case. 2 This contradicts the attitude that respect for
individual autonomy requires allowing the defendant to harm himself and
go to jail "under his own banner." Moreover, the very fact that no such
right has previously been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court mili-
tates against such use of the fourteenth amendment in the absence of a
strong case. 3
The decision in Faretta raises several difficult procedural problems.
First, the decision by the accused to proceed pro se must be made "know-
ingly and intelligently."44 However, no specific guidelines were given.45
While there is authority that the complexity of the offense charged would
be a legitimate consideration,0 the Court in Faretta noted that the ac-
cused's "technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assess-
ment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.'" '47 Other ques-
tions arise as to the weight of the trial judge's ruling on the waiver, 8 the
38. See Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
679, 686.
39. 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). In Singer the defendant waived trial by jury, but the govern-
ment refused to consent, and the Court therefore denied the waiver under FED. R. ClM. P.
23(a).
40. 95 S. Ct. at 2533 n.15.
41. Cases cited note 14 supra.
42. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932).
43. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2541.
45. See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 549, 563 (1964); Annot., 149 A.L.R. 1403, 1409-13
(1944).
46. See McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 111 (1961); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 637
(1959).
47. 95 S. Ct. at 2541.
48. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19 (1963) (trial judge's belief that the defen-
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role of intelligence tests,49 and unruly defendants." No guideline is given
as to what instructions the trial court must give the defendant." Nor is it
clear whether the defendant must be allowed to relieve his counsel and
begin defending pro se in mid-trial.5 2
dant acted intelligently and with understanding not conclusive); Johnson v. United States,
318 F.2d 855, 856 (8th Cir. 1963) (question found to be usually one of fact).
49. See Hines v. United States, 254 A.2d 408, 410 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), where intelligence
tests were held not determinative of competence.
50. Cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1970); People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226
N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967) (violent defendant apparently may be barred from
representing himself). See generally United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963);
Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Crim-
inal Court, 2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 245 (1964).
51. One set of instructions was set forth in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948):
[The] . . . duty of a federal judge to protect the constitutional rights of an accused
"cannot be discharged as though it were a mere procedural formality" . . . . [To be
a valid waiver of counsel the waiver must be made] with an apprehension of the nature
of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable
punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitiga-
tion thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.
Id. at 722, 724.
But see Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1969); Cox v. Burke, 361 F.2d
183, 186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 939 (1966), where courts held Von Moltke to be only
a guideline in the event of a guilty plea.
See United States v. Harrison, 451 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1971) (waiver of right to counsel
requires specific instructions to the accused informing him of his rights); United States v.
Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1945) (request to proceed pro se must be unequivocal).
But see Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1950) (not necessary that there be a
record showing that counsel was offered when defendant had prior experience in court and
judge believed him to be acting of free will and with clear understanding).
52. There is authority that the defendant must make his decision at the outset. People v.
Ephraim, 411 Ill. 118, 103 N.E.2d 363, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 930 (1952); People v. Jones, 11
Mich. App. 703, 704, 162 N.W.2d 152, 153 (1968); State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 552, 231 A.2d
565, 579 (1967); Application of Trevithick, 81 S.D. 121, 127, 131 N.W.2d 440, 443 (1964); cf.
United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1003
(1969); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 938 (2d Cir. 1963); United States ex rel.
Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 1073,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
But see United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 958 (1968) where the court found:
[A] defendant may not through a deliberate process of discharging retained or as-
signed counsel whenever his case is called for trial subvert sound judicial administra-
tion by such delaying tactics . . . . Though a defendant has a right to select his own
counsel if he acts expeditiously to do so. . . he may not use this right to play a "cat
and mouse" game with the court. . . or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have
the trial judge placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court,
the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel. Id. at 618-19.
Accord, United States v. Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
[Vol. 10:410
RECENT DECISIONS
While many may hail the decision in Faretta as a victory in the field of
individual rights, it is based on a questionable analysis of common law and
legislative history" and a weak assembly of decisional support.54 Further-
more, the exercise of this right may create serious procedural difficulties.
It leaves the pro se defendant at the mercy of his own ignorance since he
is entitled to no special consideration by the court." It leaves the courts
at the mercy of the ensuing procedural confusion. On the other hand, the
decision's negative impact may be mitigated by the intervention of amicus
curiae to guide a defendant who exercises his right of self-representation."6
The ultimate impact of the Court's decision will obviously depend on how
frequently the right of self-representation in criminal trials is exercised.
R.C.J.
355 U.S. 957 (1958); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 794 (1943).
53. See notes 4 & 38 supra.
54. See note 30 supra.
55. See O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds,
391 U.S. 367 (1968); Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949); People v.
Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1952).
56. In United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a "friend of the
court" was appointed to aid the accused in the event he requested assistance. But the attor-
ney's role must not be too conspicuous.
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